克里希那穆提 - 次研讨会 - 什么是「思想」？

Krishnamurti Subtitles

BR84SBR1 - 次研讨会 - 什么是「思想」？克氏与科学家们的第一次研讨会英国，布洛克伍德公园 1984年6月8日
0:25 Dr Hancke: Some of the unresolved questions in the area of brain research lie in perception, memory, and the nature of intelligence. You, Krishnamurti, have explored these questions without any scientific background and yet have indicated that thought is limited. You have also indicated that there is an intelligence beyond the ordinary functioning of the brain. As long as there is psychological conditioning, which is the self, this intelligence cannot act.	0:25 汉克博士：在研究大脑的领域，存在着一些尚未解决的问题，这些问题和感知、记忆、以及「智慧的本质」有关。而您，克里希那穆提，曾经探索过这些问题 ——虽然您没有任何科学背景，但您却已经指出了：那就是“思想是局限的”。您同样也指出了，存在着某种「智慧」，这种智慧超越了大脑的常规运作。而只要还是存在心理上的局限 ——也就是「自我」—— 那这种智慧就无法运作了。
1:04 I would like to introduce you to Dr Shainberg. He is a psychiatrist from the United States. Dr Peat is a physicist, writer, and filmmaker from Canada. Professor Bergstrom is a neuro-physiologist at the University of Helsinki, Finland. Professor Varela is a neuro-biologist at the Max Planck Institute for brain research in Frankfurt. I am a neuro-biologist and teacher at Brockwood Park.	1:04 我想要向您介绍一下在座的几位，首先是西恩博格博士。他是一位来自于美国的精神病学家。皮特博士，他一位物理学家、作家和电影制作人，他来自加拿大。伯格斯特龙教授，他是来自于芬兰赫尔辛基大学的神经生理学家。巴雷拉教授是一位神经生物学家，他在德国法兰克福的马克斯·普朗克研究所从事大脑研究工作。我本人也是一位神经生物学家，同时也是布洛克伍德公园的一名教师。
1:39 One important instrument in the understanding of the brain has been thought. I was wondering if we could discuss whether thought can help us to understand the brain, and the complexity of life.	1:39 在了解大脑这件事上，「思想」一直以来都是一个重要的工具。所以我在想，我们是否可以来讨论一下「思想」是否可以帮助我们去了解这个大脑，以及错综复杂的生活。
1:58 Krishnamurti: Do I start right off?	1:58 克里希那穆提（以下简称“克”）：我可以马上就开始吗？
2:01 H: If you wish.	2:01 汉克博士：悉听尊便。
2:08 K: Can one understand one's own brain and the activities and the complexity of the brain without operating on animals, dead bodies and so on? Can one observe, the very complex structure and nature of the brain in oneself, rather than seek it externally, outside. Is that possible? I feel it is possible if one can watch very carefully, objectively, without any bias, the reactions, the biological responses, and the inward urges and temperaments and idiosyncrasies, the whole complexity of human existence.	2:08 克：先生，我们能否了解自己的大脑，以及大脑的活动与复杂性，而无需对各种动物和尸体等等开刀动手术呢？我们能否去观察我们自己大脑复杂的结构与本质，内在的观察，而不是从外在、外部世界入手去寻求答案呢？这可能吗？我觉得这是可能的 ——如果我们可以非常小心仔细地、客观地、没有任何偏见地去观察的话，去观察我们的各种反应，那些生物学上的反应，那些内在的冲动，我们的性情、个性，以及人类存在的所有复杂性。
3:39 To approach this very complex problem, if one has a complex mind then it's not possible to understand complexity, but if one can approach it very simply. I mean, by simplicity, without compulsion, without will, without a direction, motive, just to watch the whole operation of one's own activities. And then I think it is possible to examine, or to observe the activity of one's own brain without seeking it externally.	3:39 而要处理这个非常复杂的问题，如果你是带着一个复杂的头脑，那你就不可能了解它的错综复杂了，但如果我们可以非常简单地去处理它。我的意思是，简单明了，没有强迫、没有意志力、没有方向、动机，只是去观察我们自身活动的全部运作等等。这样的话，我认为我们就有可能去检视或者观察我们大脑的活动而无需从外界寻求答案了。
4:44 Dr Shainberg: What do you mean by understand?	4:44 西恩博格博士：你所说的「了解」是什么意思？
4:47 K: By observing – I don't mean understand. By watching very carefully the complexity of oneself. What is the operation of thought, how thought arises, what is the cause of it, the origin of thought and the activities both externally, technologically, the movement of thought and the limitation of thought.	4:47 克：是通过「观察」 ——我的意思并不是通过「了解」通过非常小心仔细地去观察我们自身的复杂性。思想是怎样运转的，思想是如何升起的，思想的起因是什么，思想的起源是什么，以及思想在外在世界中的活动，科技领域中的活动，那种思想的运动，以及思想的局限性。
5:27 Dr Peat: When you say, is it possible to understand the brain, do you mean only thought and psychological reaction, or do you mean things like the fact that I can see the glass. Perception, do you mean perception as well? And the use of language?	5:27 皮特博士：当你说，我们是否可能了解这个大脑时，你的意思是不是只是指思想和心理上的反应，还是说，你的意思是指那些诸如 “我可以看到这块玻璃”之类的事实。也就是「感知」，你所指的是不是也包括了「感知」？以及「语言」的使用？
5:46 K: Surely. Linguistics, all that. The whole complexity of human endeavours, action and feelings, imagination, the whole content of all that.	5:46 克：当然了。语言学，等等这些东西。人类的努力、行动、感受、以及想象的所有复杂性，所有这一切的全部内容。
6:00 P: And learning.	6:00 皮特：还有学习。
6:01 K: Watching.	6:01 克：是「观察」。
6:02 P: Watching and being able to learn something new. Being able to learn and work in a totally new situation.	6:02 皮特：观察，然后能够学到某种全新的东西。能够在一个全新的情境中去学习和工作。
6:09 K: Would you call it learning? What is there to learn by just watching?	6:09 克：你会把它称为“学习”吗？仅仅通过观察，又有什么好学习的呢？
6:21 Dr Varela: That seems to me precisely where there seems to be a fundamental distinction between merely observing, or not merely observing, or completely observing...	6:21 瓦雷拉博士：在我看来，这恰恰是这两者间根本性的区别所在 ——也就是「单纯的观察」，或者不是“单纯的”，而只是“观察”，或者说是完整的观察
6:35 K: Yes, without the 'me'.	6:35 克：是的，而且没有那个“我”。
6:37 V: ... without the 'me' and a notion of creating a way of understanding how that observation comes to be, which is traditionally what western thinking has done, including science, creating what one can call a model, a process, a theory, a law, whatever. Now, would that endeavour be out in the approach you are proposing?	6:37 瓦雷拉：……没有“我”，但我们会想要创造出一种了解的方式，去搞清楚这种「观察」是如何出现的，这就是西方式思维习惯于做的事情，包括科学，去创造出我们所称之为“模型”的东西，一套步骤程序、理论、定律等等这些东西。那么，在你所提议的处理方式中上述这种努力是否已经被摒弃了？
7:09 K: I don't quite understand 'out', what do you mean?	7:09 克：我不是很理解“摒弃”这个词，你是什么意思？
7:12 V: It would not be pursued, it would be left behind, actually coming up with a theory or a model that would explain how does it come that we see what we see.	7:12 瓦雷拉：你不会再追求这种努力，你会抛弃它，实际上也就是提出一套理论或模型它可以用来解释我们是如何才能看到我们所见的事物的。
7:30 K: Theory or model. Is it necessary to have a theory and model to see what is actually going on?	7:30 克：理论或者模型。我们需要有理论和模型，才能看到实际正在发生的事情吗？
7:41 V: I wouldn't say it is necessary to see what is going on, but it seems to be necessary – as far as I can understand it – to understand why do I see what I see. If one has the inclination of asking the question: beyond the seeing, why do I see what I see?	7:41 瓦雷拉：我认为要看到正在发生的事情并不需要它们，但看起来我们需要 ——就我的理解来说—— 我们需要明白为什么我能看到识别我所见的东西。一个人会想要问这个问题：除了视觉表象之外，为什么我能看到识别我所见的东西？
8:00 K: Why do you see what you see, why do I feel what I feel.	8:00 克：为什么你能看到识别你所见的东西？为什么我能感受识别我的感受？
8:04 V: Yes, why do I see blue when I see blue. Very simple questions which are the ones that I've been concerned with as well.	8:04 瓦雷拉：是的，当我看到蓝色的时候，为什么我能看出它是蓝色？非常简单的问题，这些问题也是我一直以来所关心的问题。
8:12 K: Is it... We have all called that book, 'book' and I accept that. We accept it, all of us. That thing is called a book, and that thing is called a table. But the computer can't call it a table immediately.	8:12 克：是不是因为…… 我们都会把那本书称为“书”，我接受了它，我们…… 我们大家都接受了它。那个东西被称为“书”，而那个东西被称为“桌子”。但是电脑并不能立即说出它就是一张“桌子”。
8:39 V: Then you can ask yourself why the computer can't and we can, how are we made different?	8:39 瓦雷拉：然后你就会问自己，为什么电脑不能，而我们却可以，我们有何不同之处呢？
8:44 K: Because we have got the capacity to see anything, four legs or two legs, or one leg, a table, instantly.	8:44 克：因为我们已经有了那种去看见识别万物的能力，无论它是四条腿的还是两条腿的，或一条腿的，这就是一张桌子，我们立刻识别了它。
8:53 S: But what is that capacity?	8:53 西恩博格：但这种能力是什么呢？
8:54 V: This is the point.	8:54 瓦雷拉：这就是关键问题。
8:55 S: What is the capacity to do it... in other words what is the relationship of your capacity to say, that's a book, to your capacity to say it's a table, or to your capacity to see it's a table?	8:55 让我们能够这样做的那种能力是什么呢…… 换句话说，你能够说“这是一本书”的能力，和你能够说“这是一张桌子”的能力，或者你能看出那是一张桌子的能力，它们和「看见」的关系是什么呢？
9:13 H: Perhaps we should go back to the beginning question. You introduced the question of observation somehow, which was different from theorising about something, and I think perhaps it would be good to start clarifying what we mean by observing something.	9:13 汉克：或许我们应该回到最开始的问题。你以某种方式引入了关于「观察」的问题，这种「观察」不同于那种将某事物理论化的做法，所以我认为我们也许最好能从它开始：那就是先澄清一下我们所说的“观察某物”是什么意思。
9:33 K: Shall we do that?	9:33 克：我们可以来探讨这个问题吗？
9:35 V: I felt that he clarified it very well. I felt that I understood what he meant by observing.	9:35 瓦雷拉：我觉得他（克氏）已经把它讲得很清楚了。我相信我已经理解了他所说的「观察」的意思。
9:43 S: Can you tell me what you think he meant?	9:43 西恩博格：你能告诉我你认为他的意思是什么吗？
9:46 V: All right, I'll try. I think he meant by observing, completely bracketing a preassumed understanding and going into a mode of not being self-centred but of being with the object or with the movement without any precondition. To the extent that that is possible then there is an experience, there is an observation.	9:46 瓦雷拉：好吧，让我来试试。我认为他所说的「观察」的意思，就是完全搁置预设的理解，然后进入到一种「去自我中心化」的状态，只是和那个客观对象或现象运动同在，而没有任何先决条件。在这种理想状态可能达到的范围内，就会有这种体验与「观察」了。
10:10 K: So, does that imply to observe there must be no conditioning?	10:10 克：那么，这是否暗示着要去观察就必须没有局限性？
10:17 V: Yes. I think I understand that.	10:17 瓦雷拉：是的。我想我能理解这一点。
10:20 H: We have to go slowly here because you mentioned an observation without the 'me', and it doesn't seem, for me, so clear because, whenever I am looking at something, there seems to be the separation between my observing and the thing. There seems to be this division in the brain.	10:20 汉克：我们在这里必须要慢慢来，因为你提到了那种没有“我”的观察，而在我看来，这一点并不是很清楚，因为无论何时当我去看某个东西时，在我的观察和那个东西之间似乎总是有分隔的。大脑中似乎存在着这种区分。
10:43 K: Is that our conditioning?	10:43 克：这是不是就是我们的局限？
10:45 H: It seems to be one of them. Why is that?	10:45 汉克：这似乎就是我们的局限之一。为什么会这样呢？
10:49 K: There is the seer and the seen, the observer and the observed, the thinker and the thought, the experiencer and the experienced.	10:49 克：存在着「观看者」和「被看之物」，观察者和被观察物，思考者和他的思想，经验者和被经验的事物。
11:01 S: Turning it the other way from what Professor Varela was saying, I'd like to know, what is for you the relationship between the theory and observation?	11:01 西恩博格：把它反过来讲把瓦雷拉教授刚才说的东西反过来讲的话，那就是：我想要知道，对你来说，那种理论原理和「观察」之间的关系是什么？
11:11 V: Well, this is precisely where I wanted him to move.	11:11 瓦雷拉：嗯，这正是我想要他进一步探讨的东西。
11:14 K: I don't think there is any theory.	11:14 克：我认为并不存在什么理论原理。
11:17 V: All right. You accept therefore that the endeavour you are proposing would be a radical departure from what has been all of the models of knowledge from the west.	11:17 瓦雷拉：好吧。因此你所认为的是：你所提议的那种努力，它是彻底脱离了所有那些来自于西方的知识模型的。
11:30 K: Yes, sir. I may be wrong, but in observing, why should I have a theory about it?	11:30 克：是的，先生。但我也可能是错的，可是在观察的过程中，为什么我要持有关于它（观察）的某种理论原理呢？
11:39 V: Well, it seems to me that, can I just try that for one moment? When I look at that question, it feels that there is something inside me that by itself is inquisitive about why is it, or how come this is the way it is. Isn't it interesting that the paper is white and book is blue, isn't that interesting, why isn't it red?	11:39 瓦雷拉：唔，在我看来我可以试着来说几句吗？当我看到这个问题的时候，我会感到我的内在有某种东西，它会很好奇这件事为什么会如此，或者这是怎么一回事。这张纸是白色的，而这本书是蓝色的 ——这难道不是很有趣吗？为什么它不是“红色”呢？这件事难道不是很有趣吗？
12:05 K: Oh, there is a red book there.	12:05 克：噢，那里就有一本红色的书。
12:06 V: Yes, but why is that red and not this one red?	12:06 瓦雷拉：是的，但为什么那个是红色的，而不是这个东西是红色的？
12:09 K: Because we have called that red.	12:09 克：因为我们把它称为“红色”。
12:12 V: Yes, but why have we called that red? What is the process through which that comes about? That is a natural inquisitiveness that leads one into building this sort of theory, which eventually, for example, might allow me to build a machine, which would have a mind, with big quotation marks, with thoughts which could say, oh, that is a red book and that is a blue book, just at the same time when I would say it. I would consider that interesting, that's what interests me in science.	12:12 瓦雷拉：没错，但是为什么我们会把它称为“红色”？是通过什么样的过程使得这种情况发生的？这是一种很自然的好奇心，它会让我们想要去建立某种理论学说，而这种理论学说或许最终可以…… ——举个例子——让我可以制造出一个机器，这个机器会有一个“头脑”，这里的“头脑”是要加上大引号的，它会有思想，能够说：噢，这是一本红色的书，而那是一本蓝色的书，就在我要说出它的那一刻，这个机器同时也说出来了。我会觉得这是很有趣的，这就是从科学的角度来看让我感到有兴趣的地方。
12:45 K: That's not very interesting though.	12:45 克：可是这不是很有趣。
12:46 V: No?	12:46 瓦雷拉：不有趣吗？
12:48 V: I find it interesting.	12:48 瓦雷拉：我发现它很有趣。
12:50 K: All right, go ahead. I thought you said that was not very interesting.	12:50 克：好吧，请你继续讲。我以为你刚才说的是 “这不是很有趣”。
13:00 V: No, I find it interesting and that's why I said when you asked, do we need a theory at all, I said not really, but there is this inquisitiveness that seems to constantly come up of asking the question of how is it like that, how can we understand that, how can we have an image, a representation of a process where that can speak?	13:00 瓦雷拉：不，不，我觉得它很有趣，这就是为什么我会说：当你问：我们真的需要某种理论体系吗，我说其实不需要，但我们还是会有这种好奇心，这种好奇似乎会不断地涌现出来，它会问：这是怎么回事呢？我们如何才能理解这件事？我们如何让一个意象、让某个过程的呈现，具备说出那种话的能力的？
13:23 S: I don't think you're saying enough, and I wish you would say more. It's not just that the theory is good because you're inquisitive but the theory also functions to establish for you, or for me the interrelationship between these issues, therefore you're not just looking – this ultimately will come down to our question, what is the relationship of theory to observation – but your theory functions as a way to help you to distinguish red, white, and blue, and why you're seeing it, and therefore you have an interdigitation of many different aspects of your curiosity. So, it's more complicated than that.	13:23 西恩博格：我认为你说得还不够，我希望你可以再多说一些。理论学说很好，并不只是因为你的好奇心，而是因为这个理论还有一些功能：那就是可以为你、为我建立起一种这些问题之间的相互关系，由此你就不只是在看 ——这最终会导向我们的问题，那就是：理论和观察有什么关系？而你的理论的作用就是作为一种途径来帮助你去区分红色、白色和蓝色，以及为什么你能看到这些颜色，由此你便可以把你所好奇事物的诸多不同方面交错接合起来了。所以它要比这更为复杂一些。
14:07 P: We are talking about perception and it is not clear whether we are talking about psychological perception, but if we just ask how you see the glass and Krishnamurti has said that it is possible to explore the whole mechanism of seeing the glass of water, one can observe oneself doing it. All neuro-scientists would say that's nonsense, that can't possibly be true. There must be many levels of operation which are purely mechanical, which we can never have any direct experience of, at the level of the eye and the optic nerve. Krishnamurti seems to be saying something different, I'm not sure if I understand, something much more radical than that. Is it possible to be aware of every level of the process?	14:07 皮特：我们正在谈论的是「感知」，但尚未清楚的一点就是：我们在谈论的是否是心理上的感知，但如果我们只是问：你是如何看到这只玻璃杯的，而克里希那穆提说：我们是可能去探索发现“看这杯水”的全部机制的，我们可以观察到自己正在做这件事。但所有的神经科学家都会说这是荒谬无意义的，这不可能是正确的。因为必然会存在着很多的运作层级，这些运作层级是纯粹机械化的，而我们是绝对不可能直接体验到这些运作层级的，比如眼睛的运作层级和视神经的运作层级。但克里希那穆提在说的似乎是某种不同的东西，我不确定我是否理解了，那是某种远远比这更为根本性的东西。也就是，我们是否可能感知意识到这个过程中的每一个层级？
14:53 Prof. Bergstrom: Coming back to the original question about the brain, understanding the brain or dissecting it. If we look from the point of view of neuro-physiology and brain research and so on, there exists, as a matter of fact, two kinds of brain. The whole brain, which sees blue, red, and so on, and the other brain is the brain which consists of its parts, the cells, synapses, molecules, and so on. The physiologist looks, and there comes the theory: experimenting, dissecting, theorising and so on, looks at the brain which consists of the parts, an assembly of fragments. 15:48 Now I am coming to the original question. The other way, we also have to face as physiologists that brain which perceives, which is only one, 'me', or whatever the individual calls itself, that is another way. We always have to distinguish between these two, the first would be the theoretical brain with fragments and parts, and the other would be the human brain. Therefore I answer Krishnamurti's question, I think we really can know about the brain without dissecting it.	14:53 伯格斯特龙教授：让我们回到最初的那个关于大脑的问题，了解这个大脑或者解剖它。如果我们是从神经生理学、以及大脑研究等等角度去看它的话，那么事实上，存在着两种“大脑”。一个是整体性的大脑，它可以看到蓝色、红色等等而另一个大脑则是由各个部分所组成的大脑 ——比如细胞、突触、分子，等等。生理学家会去看这些部分，然后建立某套理论：他们会去试验、解剖、从理论上说明它，等等，去看一下大脑，大脑是由各个部分所组成的，它是各种“碎片”的聚合体。 15:48 而现在，我要回到最初的问题了。另一方面，作为生理学家，我们同样也要面对那个在感知的大脑 ——它具有唯一性，它就是“我”，或者无论个体自称为什么，这是另一个方面。我们总是需要去区分辨别这两者，第一个是由各种“碎片”和部分所组成的理论上的「大脑」，而另一个则是「人的大脑」。所以，我来回答一下克里希那穆提的问题，我认为我们其实可以知晓大脑而无需去解剖它。
16:34 V: That we cannot, you say?	16:34 瓦雷拉：你是说我们不可以吗？
16:36 B: That we can study the brain as a whole, that we do.	16:36 伯格斯特龙：我是说我们可以将大脑作为一个整体去研究它，我们是可以这么做的。
16:41 K: Why do we divide the brain at all?	16:41 克：我们究竟为什么要划分这个大脑呢？
16:43 B: Yes, that's the question.	16:43 伯格斯特龙：是的，这就是问题所在。
16:46 K: Why not treat it as a whole movement?	16:46 克：为什么不把它当成一个整体性的运动来看待它呢？
16:49 V: I don't have anything against that. That doesn't resolve the issue of whether we need the theory for the observation. Because I can have a theory which is a holistic theory, which deals with the brain as a totality.	16:49 瓦雷拉：我对此没有任何反对意见。但它是无法解决这个问题的：即我们是否需要有关于「观察」的理论学说。因为我可以拥有某种理论学说 ——它是一种完整全面的理论，它可以将大脑作为一个整体去处理它。
17:02 K: Not a holistic theory, but it is so!	17:02 克：不需要什么完整的理论，它就是如此！
17:08 H: I think the theory comes into being in order to organise the certain facts that you have. You have to give a certain coherence and logic to the facts that you are accumulating, and I think Professor Varela said something very interesting. If you take, for example, a child. From the very beginning it seems there is a natural tendency to discover things and to attribute meaning to things.	17:08 汉克：我认为理论学说的出现是为了将你所知道的某些事实组织关联起来。你必须要给那些你正在积累起来的事实某种条理连贯性和逻辑性，而我认为瓦雷拉教授说了某些非常有趣的东西。举个例子，如果你去看一个小孩，你会发现：从一开始小孩似乎就有一种天生的倾向：那就是去发现了解事物，然后赋予这些事物以某种意义。
17:36 B: But a theory cannot be holistic. There are always parts, a collection of parts.	17:36 伯格斯特龙：然而「理论」不可能是整体性的。它总是会有各种部分，它是各个部分的集合体。
17:43 V: Oh, that's a touchy one, I don't agree. That would take us in another direction.	17:43 瓦雷拉：噢，这是一个敏感有争议的问题，我可不这么认为。这会把我们带往另一个方向。
17:50 K: By collecting all the parts you make the whole?	17:50 克：通过收集所有的部分，你就可以拼凑出整体吗？
17:53 V: No, of course not. I agree absolutely, but what I mean by holistic theory is a theory that has, built in itself, the awareness of its fragmentedness, which is quite a different thing.	17:53 瓦雷拉：不，当然不能了。我完全赞同这点。但我所说的“整体性的理论”的意思，是一种自身内在就包含了对其碎片化有所觉察的理论。这是一件完全不同的事。
18:11 K: All right, can we put it this way: one is aware that we are fragmented human beings, right? Those fragments, we are trying to bring all of them together, and that doesn't make the whole.	18:11 克：好吧。我们能否这样子来表述它：我们觉察到了自己是碎片化的人类，对吧？而我们正试图将所有这些碎片组合在一起，然而这并不能拼凑出「整体」。伯格斯特龙：是的，它并不能。
18:33 B: No, it doesn't.	18:33 瓦雷拉：绝对不能。
18:35 V: Absolutely.	18:35 汉克：所以，我们要怎么样继续下去呢？
18:38 H: So, how is one to proceed then?	18:38 克：你看到了，这是显而易见的事。
18:43 K: You see the obvious.	18:43 汉克：这一结论无法从前提中推导得出。
18:45 H: It doesn't follow from that.	18:45 克：我的意思是，比方说车的辐条，你可以收集车轮的所有辐条，
18:47 K: I mean, spokes, you collect all the spokes of a wheel but the spokes don't make the wheel, you have to put it together, right? I don't quite see the difficulty in this.	18:47 然而这些辐条并不能产生车轮，你必须要将它们组装起来才行，对吧？我不是很明白这有什么难懂的。
19:03 P: To put the wheel together you also need some technical knowledge as well as the perception of the whole, and where does the technical knowledge come from?	19:03 皮特：要将车轮组装起来，你同样也需要一些技术知识，同时也要看到那个整体，那么这种技术知识是来自于哪里呢？
19:12 K: Is that what we are trying to do? Technical knowledge, how to put the brain together?	19:12 克：这是否就是我们试图在做的事？学习技术知识，如何将那个大脑拼凑起来？
19:18 P: No, but you say to understand the brain, the technical knowledge is really not important, the dissection.	19:18 皮特：不，可你说…… 要了解那个大脑，技术上的知识其实并不重要，也就是那些解剖学的东西。
19:26 K: I didn't say that.	19:26 克：我可没这么说。
19:28 V: He said 'can we' have a theory?	19:28 瓦雷拉：他说的是“我们是否能够” 拥有一种理论学说？
19:30 P: Can we, without opening the hood of the car and seeing all the parts inside.	19:30 皮特：我们是否能够不打开汽车的引擎盖，而看到里面所有的部件呢？
19:34 V: For my part, that to me is a fascinating question. There is nothing that I would like more than to be able to ask the questions about how knowledge works, without having to disrupt an animal. It pains my heart that we have to carry on with this knowledge by disrupting life. I don't like that. As a matter of fact, I don't want to do it anymore, but still the inquisitiveness is there.	19:34 瓦雷拉：就我而言，这对我来说是一个很有意思的问题。我最大的愿望莫过于能够直接探询关于“知识是如何运作”的问题，而无需解剖伤害动物。要通过伤害生命来追求这种知识，这让我很心痛，我不喜欢这样。事实上，我已经不想再做这样的事了，然而那种好奇心仍旧在那里。
19:59 K: Now, where shall we begin, we have put so many things?	19:59 克：所以，我们要从哪里开始呢，我们已经提出了这么多的话题？
20:04 B: There is one reason why we should know a little bit about brain cells and so on, and that is the diseases, a sick brain. So, that I think is one of the reasons why they began to fragmentise and dissect.	20:04 伯格斯特龙：有一个原因可以解释为什么我们应该知道一点关于大脑细胞等等的知识，那就是疾病，大脑疾病。因此我认为这就是为什么他们会开始将大脑分成各个部分和解剖大脑的原因之一。
20:31 H: Perhaps we could come back and stick to one question. We started by saying can the brain understand itself, what does that mean, is it possible that thought can understand the brain? I think we should stick to that.	20:31 汉克：我们或许应该回到这个问题，并紧盯住这个问题。我们一开始的时候说了：大脑能否了解它自己，以及这意味着什么，思想是否可能了解那个大脑呢？我认为我们应该紧盯这个问题。
20:45 K: Would you say the brain is the centre of thought?	20:45 克：你会认为大脑就是思想的中心吗？
20:50 V: No.	20:50 瓦雷拉：不。
20:52 K: Just a minute. Thought, feelings, physical responses, biological responses, and also the brain is the centre of one's 'consciousness': fears, pleasures, anxiety, all that, sorrow, the whole of that consciousness – if you will accept that word – is in the brain, it is not out there. Would you agree?	20:52 克：先等下。大脑是否是思想、感受、身体反应、生理反应的中心？而大脑同样也是我们“意识”的中心：恐惧、快感、焦虑，等等，苦难，那种「意识」的全部内容 ——如果你可以接受这个词的话—— 这些内容全都在大脑中，它们并不在大脑之外。你们同意这点吗？
21:30 V: I'm afraid I would have to disagree.	21:30 瓦雷拉：我对此恐怕有不同的意见。
21:32 K: Oh, delighted.	21:32 克：噢，我很高兴。
21:33 V: I don't think that thought or consciousness is in the brain. That this is precisely one of the greatest mistakes.	21:33 瓦雷拉：我并不认为思想或意识是存在于大脑中的。这恰恰是最大的错误之一。
21:39 K: Wait, thought is outside?	21:39 克：等下，思想难道是在大脑之外的？
21:41 V: It's neither outside nor inside, there is a quality of relationship which thought is of.	21:41 瓦雷拉：它既不是外在的，也不是内在的，存在着一种关系的特质，而思想就属于这种“特质”。
21:46 K: Wait, then we have to inquire what is thought. Can we begin with that? Would you agree?	21:46 克：等一下，那我们就必须要探询一下什么是思想了。我们可以从它开始吗？你们同意吗？
21:56 V: Yes, let's do that.	21:56 瓦雷拉：好的，让我们开始吧。
21:58 K: What is thought, what is thinking?	21:58 克：什么是「思想」，什么是「思考」？
22:04 V: Do you want to go first?	22:04 瓦雷拉：你想要先讲吗？
22:06 K: It is a discussion.	22:06 克：这是一场讨论。
22:08 V: I would say that thought belongs to a form of action which is related to separating, precisely, to separating a unit from its context. That any separation of a unit from its context is a form of cognition or thought, at a fundamental level. Therefore, the thought cannot exist without the relationship between that which is distinguished and what it is distinguished from.	22:08 瓦雷拉：我想说「思想」属于某种形式的“行动” ——这种“行动”和「分离」有关，准确地说，就是将一个单元从其背景中分离出来。从最根本的层面上来讲，任何单元从其背景中的「分离」，它都是一种认知结果，或者说是「思想」。因此，如果没有那个被区分的事物和它从中被区分出来的背景之间的关系，思想就不可能存在了。
22:44 S: Wait a second. Do you think that thought is an event that arises de novo, or is it some sort of process event which articulates the separation and arrives at the awareness? In other words, that the arrival of thought is the articulation of the separation?	22:44 西恩博格：稍等一下。你认为「思想」是一种凭空产生的事件吗？还是说它是某种过程化的事件 ——它清楚地表达了这种「分离」，然后抵达了我们的觉知？换句话说，思想的出现是这种「分离」的清晰表达吗？
23:08 V: No, it's an emergent quality.	23:08 瓦雷拉：不，它是一种“突现”的特质。
23:11 S: So it's not a de novo separation, it's an emergent event.	23:11 西恩博格：所以它并不是凭空出现的「分离」，它是一个“突现”的事件。
23:15 K: It's emerging.	23:15 克：它是突然出现的东西。
23:17 S: That's important, the emerging, not a separation at the instant.	23:17 西恩博格：这很重要，它是一种“突现”，而非即刻的「分离」。
23:21 V: It's immanent in the action of the separation.	23:21 瓦雷拉：它是那种分离行动内在所固有的东西。
23:23 K: It's emerging, it's being born.	23:23 克：它是突然浮现的，它是产生出来的东西。
23:25 V: Exactly.	23:25 瓦雷拉：没错。
23:27 S: That's an important distinction.	23:27 西恩博格：这是一个重要的区别。
23:29 K: Yes, being born all the time.	23:29 克：是的，思想一直在不断地产生。
23:30 S: Exactly.	23:30 西恩博格：确实如此。
23:32 K: From where?	23:32 克：那它是来自于哪里的？
23:33 H: What is the source?	23:33 汉克：思想的源头是什么？
23:36 K: Wait. The thought is being born, emerging, growing, coming and going, from where?	23:36 克：请稍等一下。思想在不断地产生、浮现、成长，它来来去去，那它是从哪里来的？
23:51 S: That may be the wrong question, from where, because by saying from where, you've already made a definition, and you've separated out process, you've made a distinction... – by saying where, you've got a definition.	23:51 西恩博格：你问“它是从哪里来的”，这可能是一个错误的问题，因为当你问它是从哪里来的，你就已经下了一个定义，你已经把那个过程分离出来了，你做了一个区分 ——因为你问“它来自于哪里”，你已经有了一个定义。
24:13 K: No, put another word if you like.	24:13 克：不是这样的，如果你愿意的话，你也可以换一种问法。
24:20 S: I would prefer what's the action that arrives in thought?	24:20 西恩博格：我更愿意问：那种在思想中出现的“行动”是什么？
24:26 K: Wait, then you have to ask what is action?	24:26 克：等一下，那样的话，你就必须问一下：什么是“行动”了。
24:32 V: So it is a movement?	24:32 瓦雷拉：所以，它（思想）是一种运动吗？
24:34 K: Yes, what is this whole movement?	24:34 克：是的，那么这整个运动是什么呢？
24:36 V: OK, when I inspect that question in myself the only answer I can get to is it's an unlimited frontier. That is, the moment I am in thought I have obscured for myself that which I am asking. Therefore the source of movement, or the source of thought is an unlimited space which is beyond thought.	24:36 瓦雷拉：好吧，当我在内心检视这个问题，我所能得到的唯一答案就是它是一种“无限的边界”。换句话说，当我沉浸在思想中时，我就已经把那个我正在询问的东西变模糊了。因此这种运动的源头，或者说思想的源头，它就是一个无限的空间 ——这个空间是超越思想的。
25:07 K: I wonder.	25:07 克：我怀疑。
25:09 S: About what, what do you wonder?	25:09 西恩博格：怀疑什么，你在怀疑什么呢？
25:12 K: What is the relationship between thought and action? That's what we are discussing.	25:12 克：思想和行动之间的关系是什么呢？这就是我们正在讨论的东西。
25:18 V: Yes, but thought occurs, thought happens. I find myself in thought.	25:18 瓦雷拉：是的，但是思想会出现，思想会发生。我会发现自己陷入于思想中。
25:24 S: Therefore it is action.	25:24 西恩博格：因此思想就是行动。
25:26 K: You just now said thought is born, comes into being. It must have some causation.	25:26 克：先生，你刚刚说了，思想会产生、会出现。那它一定会有某个起因。
25:40 V: Yes, but in order to see the causation I will have to put myself out from thought.	25:40 瓦雷拉：是的，但为了看到那个起因，我就必须要将自己置身于思想之外。
25:44 K: We'll see. So, now we have to inquire whether it is possible to observe the causation without the observer, who is the outside, right?	25:44 克：这点我们可以再讨论。所以现在，我们就必须去探询一下我们是否可能去观察那个起因而没有那个“置身事外”的观察者，对吧？
26:06 V: Right, absolutely.	26:06 瓦雷拉：没错，完全正确。
26:14 K: So, can one observe the cause without the observer? Can the causation be observed without the outsider or the observer, the witnesser? Which means the observer, the person who perceives. Is not the observed the observer?	26:14 克：所以，我们能否观察那个起因而没有观察者呢？那个起因能否被观察到 ——但却没有一个局外人、一个观察者、一个目击者呢？这意味着那个观察者、那个在看的人那个被观察物，它难道不就是观察者吗？
26:58 S: Say that again.	26:58 西恩博格：请再说一遍。
27:02 V: Can you say that again?	27:02 瓦雷拉：你能把它再说一遍吗？
27:05 K: I know, I can't repeat it, I'll put it another way. There is a perception of you sitting there and I sitting here. When I see you, you have been introduced to me, I remember all that memory of it, it is the observer. Can I look at you without the observer, without the knowledge of you? Of course I can.	27:05 克：我明白，但我很难再去重复它，让我换个说法吧。我看到了你坐在那里，而我坐在这里。当我见到你以后，人们便把你介绍给我了，于是我记住了所有那些关于你的记忆 ——这就是「观察者」。那么我能否看着你，而没有这个「观察者」、没有对于你的认识了解呢？我当然可以了。
27:47 H: I think we have to go slowly because it is a great step.	27:47 汉克：我觉得我们必须慢慢来，因为这一步迈得很大。
27:54 V: Yes, you can.	27:54 瓦雷拉：是的，你可以。
27:55 K: Of course, therefore the observer is the observed. There is no separation. There is separation only when the observer is different from the observed.	27:55 克：当然可以了，这样的话，那个观察者就是被观察物了。不存在「区分」了。只有当观察者是不同于被观察物时才会有「区分」
28:08 V: Correct. Absolutely. So that is an observation.	28:08 瓦雷拉：对。确实如此。所以，这才是「观察」。
28:14 K: That's real observation without the observer. The observer is the past, memory, knowledge, experience. All the observer is the past. Can I look at something without the past? Of course it's possible. Wait, just let me finish. And then what is action? You understand?	28:14 克：这才是真正的「观察」 ——它没有观察者。「观察者」就是过去、记忆、知识、经验。所有的观察者都是「过去」。那么我能否不带着「过去」去看某个事物？这当然是可能的。等等，让我先讲完。那么，什么是「行动」呢？你们理解了吗？
28:50 V: Yes. What is action for that...	28:50 瓦雷拉：理解了。对于那种……的行动是什么？
28:54 K: What is action. Leave that for the moment. What is action? When there is no observer, what is action?	28:54 克：什么是「行动」？先别管“那种……”了。什么是行动？当没有了观察者以后，什么是行动呢？
29:17 B: Being together only and nothing else, without separation.	29:17 伯格斯特龙：只是「同在」，没有别的，没有「分离」。
29:24 H: I would like to, if I may, come back to the question. Why are we normally making this separation between what we observe – the brain is normally doing that anyhow. So, perhaps one could say that it might be normal for the brain.	29:24 汉克：如果可以的话，我想要回到那个问题。为什么我们通常都会做这种区分：也就是把我们所观察的事物分离出来通常来说，大脑无论如何都会这么做。所以，我们或许可以说：它（区分）对于大脑来说也许是很正常的事。
29:41 K: That may be our tradition, that may be our education, may be we have been told from childhood that is different from you, you are different from me.	29:41 克：它（区分）可能是我们的传统惯例，可能是我们的教育所教的东西，也许我们从小就被告知说那个东西是不同于你的，你和我是不同的。
29:54 S: But let's say, when you were introduced to him your perception of him at that instant was the observation without the observer. Then now when you look at him, you've got the memory.	29:54 西恩博格：但是，假设有人把你介绍给他了，这时你看到了他，在这个瞬间，这就是没有观察者的观察。然而现在，当你看到他的时候，你就会有（关于他的）记忆了。
30:09 K: I begin to accumulate. The brain begins to accumulate the knowledge about him. He says he won't operate anymore, so I say, by Jove, is he... and all the rest of it. My point is, to put it much simpler, not to record.	30:09 克：因为我开始积累了大脑开始积累关于他的认识了解。他说他不会再去动手术了，于是我会说：天哪，他是不是……？等等诸如此类的事情。所以……我的意思是——说得更简单一点—— 那就是「不要去记录」。
30:36 S: But you did record.	30:36 西恩博格：但你确实记录了。
30:38 K: I did, but that is very simple.	30:38 克：我确实记录了，但这件事是很简单的。
30:41 S: You didn't record, then you did record.	30:41 西恩博格：虽然你不去记录，但你确实还是记录了。
30:44 K: No, just a minute. In my relationship with you, with you all, I have recorded – suppose I have recorded – then that record becomes the observer, but if there is no record there is only seeing, observing.	30:44 克：不，稍等片刻。在我和你的关系中…… 和你们所有人的关系中，我已经记录了 ——假设我已经记录了—— 那时这种记录就变成了「观察者」，但如果没有了「记录」，那么就只存在「看」和「观察」了。
31:07 S: But suppose we say that the brain is recording.	31:07 西恩博格：但假设我们说大脑正在记录。
31:11 K: No, sir, is it possible not to record? I know the mechanism of recording. You're off on something else.	31:11 克：不是，先生，（我问的是）是否可能不去记录？我知道那种记录的机制。你跑题了。
31:22 H: No, I think that is an interesting point.	31:22 汉克：不，我认为这是很有趣的一点。
31:25 V: Can you hold on just for a second because I want to pursue that for one moment. But we have agreed that it is possible to observe without recording.	31:25 瓦雷拉：你能稍微等一会儿吗，因为目前我想要继续探讨这一点。但我们已经同意了这一点：即「没有记录的观察」是可能的。
31:37 K: Is that a theory?	31:37 克：这是一种理论吗？
31:38 V: No.	31:38 瓦雷拉：不是。
31:39 K: Actuality?	31:39 克：它对你而言是事实？
31:40 V: Yes, it is possible.	31:40 瓦雷拉：是的，它是可能的。
31:41 K: The moment you say it is possible, you have made it a theory.	31:41 克：当你说它“可能”的时候，你已经把它变成了一个理论。
31:46 P: I think we have to agree it is a theory for us. I don't think we are being honest. We are just saying yes, but we don't really believe that.	31:46 皮特：我认为我们必须要承认它对我们来说只是一种理论。我认为我们并没有做到诚实。我们只是在那里说“是的”，但我们其实并不是真的相信它。
31:59 H: For example, In science, if there is a scientist one could say that this division between the observer and the observed is necessary to a certain extent, when you are dealing with an experiment or with the outside world. So, it doesn't necessarily follow that psychologically we are doing exactly the same.	31:59 汉克：举个例子，在科学中，对于一位科学家而言，我们可以说：这种观察者和被观察物之间的区分从某种程度上来看是必需的 ——比如当你在做一个实验，或者处理外部世界的事物时。然而，这并不一定意味着在心理上，我们也要做同样的事情。
32:30 K: I understand. After all, as a human being, with the result of fifty thousand years, tremendous accumulation of knowledge, experience, all that, I am that! And that is looking at something else, so separating itself constantly.	32:30 克：我能理解。毕竟作为人类的一员，我们携带着人类五万年以来的结果，我们积累了无数的知识、经验，等等这些东西，我就是这些东西！而「这些东西」正在观察别的东西，由此便总是会把自己分离出来了。
33:00 V: Yes, this is precisely the point, that that separation has to be sustained by an ongoing process which has constant breakdowns, and at the point of those breakdowns there is that closing the gap. So, for example, in my perception of you right now I am constantly having gaps or flashes of this observer, and it's cracky, it's gappy.	33:00 瓦雷拉：是的，这正是关键点，这种「分离」必须要靠一个持续不断的过程来维持，这个过程中会不断地有各种“中断”，而在这些“中断”的节点，那道裂缝会闭合。所以，举个例子，当我现在看到你的时候，我就会不断地有这种观察者的“裂缝”或“闪现”，它会有很多“裂缝”和“缺口”。
33:27 K: I say why is there this contradiction all the time.	33:27 克：我在说的是：为什么一直会有这种矛盾？
33:32 V: No, this is precisely the point. Why do we have to see a contradiction there? It seems that both things are there. I was actually going back to something you raised. That it seems we have both of them, observation with the observer and...	33:32 瓦雷拉：不，这正是关键点所在。为什么我们一定要去看那里的矛盾呢？看起来这两个东西都在那儿。我实际上是回到了你所提出的某些观点。那就是，我们看起来同时拥有这两者，带着观察者的观察，还有
33:52 K: At one level, yes. If I met you again tomorrow I can't reintroduce myself, it would be silly. At that level it is necessary, but at a deeper level, why should I carry all the memory of meeting you, why should there be a recording of it at all? I meet you, finished.	33:52 克：从某个层次上来说，是这样的。如果我明天再次遇见你，我是不会再向你介绍自己的，否则我就太蠢了。在那个层次上，它是需要的，然而在更深的层次上，当我遇见你的时候，为什么我要携带着所有相关记忆呢？我究竟为什么要记录它呢？我遇见了你，到此为止就行了。
34:24 V: Didn't you just answer the question by saying that if you did one without the other, if you just met me without accumulation then tomorrow we would have to go through the presentation again. So therefore, both of them are necessary.	34:24 瓦雷拉：你刚才难道不是回答了这个问题吗，你说：如果你只做其中一个而不做另一个的话，如果你只是见到我而没有任何「积累」，那么明天我们就必须要再次互相介绍了。因此，这两者都是必需的。
34:42 K: Yes, at one level.	34:42 克：是的，在某个层次上（两者都是必需的）。
34:49 S: I have never heard you use that word 'level'. What do you mean by levels and what is the relationship between levels in your terms?	34:49 西恩博格：我从未听到过你使用“层次”这个词。你所说的“层次”是什么意思？在你所界定的概念中，这些“层次”之间存在怎样的关系？
34:58 K: I think it is fairly simple.	34:58 克：我觉得这相当简单啊。
35:00 S: Well, I'm stupid, I don't understand.	35:00 西恩博格：好吧，是我太笨了，我无法理解。
35:02 K: I am stupid probably.	35:02 克：也可能是我太笨了。
35:05 V: That makes two of us.	35:05 瓦雷拉：我们两个都一样。
35:12 K: I need to know how to write a letter, right? There knowledge is necessary, to drive a car or anything. Physically to do anything I must have a great deal of information, knowledge and accumulated memory and so on, right? Psychologically, if you don't like to use that word, inwardly, why should I accumulate, why should there be accumulation?	35:12 克：我需要知道如何写一封信，对吧？在写信这件事上，知识是必需的，也包括驾驶汽车等等。要去做某些身体层面上的事情，我就必须要有大量的信息、知识，以及积累下来的记忆，等等，对吧？但是心理上…… ——如果你们不喜欢用这个词，那就换成“内心”吧，为什么我在内心要去积累，为什么在这个领域中也要有积累呢？
35:50 H: If I understood well what you were saying, Francisco and you, even when you say that the brain does not record there is still a process of recognition which necessarily must involve certain levels of memory.	35:50 汉克：如果我没理解错你刚才所说的东西 ——弗朗西斯科和你所说的东西，那就是即使当你说“大脑没有去记录”时，那个「识别」的过程仍然是存在的，而它必定会涉及到某种程度上的记忆。
36:05 K: We said that.	36:05 克：这个我们已经说过了。
36:08 H: So what do you mean by 'when the brain does not record'?	36:08 汉克：所以，当你说“当大脑不去记录时”，你是什么意思呢？
36:12 K: Is that possible first of all, psychologically, not to record? You understand my question? You say something brutal to me, why should I record it? This recording is the self.	36:12 克：首先来说，这可能吗？在心理上不去记录？你理解我的问题吗？你对我说了一些残忍的话，为什么我要去记录它呢？这种“记录”就是「自我」。
36:32 P: Suppose I said that to see anything there has to be a great accumulation. You could say that there could be no perception without the accumulation and the accumulation includes the actual structure of the brain that has evolved over millions of years, that is in a sense a form of memory. Matter has formed in certain connections and that is preserved over a very long time. So I could say that there is no perception without some form of accumulation of memory and knowledge.	36:32 皮特：假设我说：要去看任何事物，你就必须要有大量的积累。你可以说，要是没有积累，那就不可能会有「看」了，而这种积累就包括了大脑实际的组织结构，这种组织机构已经进化了超过数百万年了，而它从某种意义上来说就是一种记忆。「物质」以某些关联方式被构建起来了，然后它被维系了很长一段时间。所以我会说：要是没有某种记忆与知识的积累，那就不可能会有「看」了。
37:03 K: Of course, we agree, we have stated that.	37:03 克：当然了，这点我们也同意，我们已经说过这个了。
37:05 P: So, without it there is no perception and this is something that always continues. Is this different from a psychological recording?	37:05 皮特：所以，没有它的话就没有「看」了，因此这是某种一直在持续的事情。那它和「心理上的记录」有区别吗？
37:19 K: That is what we are asking.	37:19 克：这就是我们正在询问的东西。
37:21 H: That is an important question to clarify.	37:21 汉克：这是一个需要澄清的重要问题。
37:24 K: We made it clear just now, didn't we?	37:24 克：我们刚才已经把它说得很清楚了，没有吗？
37:28 V: Absolutely.	37:28 瓦雷拉：确实很清楚了。
37:29 K: That I need knowledge. If I am a carpenter, I need a great deal of knowledge. The quality of the wood, the grain and the instruments, and so on and so on. That is necessary, I don't object to that. That is so, otherwise we can't live. But at the inward level...	37:29 克：也就是说：我的确需要「知识」。如果我是一个木匠，我将会需要大量的知识。我需要了解木头的品质、纹理，还有各种木工工具，等等，等等。这是必不可少的，我并不反对这一点。事实就是如此，否则的话我们就无法生活下去了。然而在内在层次上……
37:53 S: What level is that?	37:53 西恩博格：你说的“层次”是什么？
37:56 K: Forget the word, throw the word out.	37:56 克：忘了这个词（层次），把它扔掉吧。
37:59 K: Inwardly...	37:59 克：从内在来讲……
38:01 S: What is that, what is inward?	38:01 西恩博格：那又是什么，“内在”指的是什么？
38:04 K: The feeling, the psyche. You should know, you are the psychologist.	38:04 克：情感情绪，人的心理。你应该懂的，你可是心理学家呀。
38:14 P: Is there a separation between these two levels, are you pulling the two apart, that's the psychological, that's the practical, and the two can be absolutely seperate?	38:14 皮特：这两个层次彼此之间是分离的吗？你正在把这两者区分开来吗？一边是心理的，一边是实际的，可是这两者能够被绝对地区分开来吗？
38:23 K: No, I see knowledge is necessary, and also I am questioning whether inwardly, psychically, psychologically, any word you use, inside the skin as it were, why should there be any recording at all? Wait, just a minute. This recording, inwardly, is the divisive process. The divisive process is the self, the 'me' and the 'not me' which is creating havoc in the world. That's all. Wait, let me finish!	38:23 克：不，我看到了知识是必需的，但同时我也在质疑在内心世界、精神世界和心理世界中你可以使用任何词语，反正就是“肌肤之内”的世界，在这个世界中，究竟为什么要有任何记录呢？等一下，稍等片刻。这种记录，内心的记录，它是一个造成分裂的过程。而这个分裂化的过程就是「自我」， “我”和“无我”。它造成了这个世界的灾难混乱。就是这样。等一下，让我讲讲完！
39:20 The mechanism which has gone on for centuries, the 'me' and the 'not me', can that mechanism stop, so that there is no 'me' inwardly? The 'me' being the self, and all the rest. That's all. This has been not only a question for the scientists, but for the religious people, the serious ones, not the phoney ones. The real religious people have said, can there be no self at all, and live in this world, not go off into monasteries or run away to some kind of fanciful entertainment. Actually live without the self. That's all. Which requires a further statement, which is, is it possible not to record inwardly, psychically and all that? I'd say it is possible. You may say, you are a nut, you are crazy, but it's all right, we'll discuss it.	39:20 这种机制已经持续了无数世纪了， “我”和“无我”，那么这种机制可以停止吗？由此我们内在就可以没有「我」了。这个“我”就是「自我」、等等这类东西。就是这样。一直以来，这不仅是一个科学家们的问题，也是宗教人士的问题，那些认真严肃的宗教人士，而不是那些骗子。真正的宗教人士曾经说过：是否可能完全没有「自我」？是生活在这个尘世中，而不是跑到修道院里去，或者逃到某种充满幻想的娱乐中去。而是真正地没有「自我」地生活。就是这样。而这还需要进一步的表述，也就是我们是否可能在内心、在精神等等领域中不去记录？我想说：这是可能的。但你们或许会说：你真是一个怪人，你是一个疯子，这没有关系，我们可以来讨论它。
40:37 B: There is, I think, a stage in the development of the child, very early child, possibly a child can have this.	40:37 伯格斯特龙：我认为存在那么一个阶段，也就是小孩成长的阶段，很小的小孩，这样的小孩有可能会这样（不去记录）。
40:48 K: You see it already in the child. Give him a toy and you try to take it and he says, it's mine.	40:48 克：但你已经可以在小孩身上看到这一点了。你给了小孩一个玩具，而当你试图拿走这个玩具，小孩就会说：这是我的。
40:54 B: Yes, but I think before that stage, a child of one or two years, and then comes the that's mine, but before, there is a stage where I think they live together. They are one with the mother and so on.	40:54 伯格斯特龙：是的，但我想的是在这个阶段之前，也就是一两岁的孩子，在这之后，才出现了“这是我的东西”，但在这之前，有这样一个阶段：我认为他们生活在一起。他们（小孩）只是和母亲待在一起，等等。
41:17 K: I believe I've read somewhere or have been told, I'm not a reader, I have been told by scientists who are looking at babies that the babies already know when a visitor is friendly to the mother or not.	41:17 克：我想我曾经在哪里读到过，或者是有人曾告诉过我……因为我不太看书，曾经有一些科学家告诉过我…… 他们观察了那些婴儿，然后他们发现，这些婴儿已经知道来访者对母亲是友好还是不友好了。
41:37 B: Yes.	41:37 伯格斯特龙：好吧。
41:39 K: Already, you understand, by the atmosphere, by the feeling, or by the mother's shrinking.	41:39 克：他们已经知道了，你理解了吗？通过那种气氛、通过感觉、或者通过母亲的畏缩。
41:47 B: That's true.	41:47 伯格斯特龙：没错。
41:50 V: But in your question, one of the reasons why it has so many sides to it is that, as a brain researcher, as a scientist, it seems reasonable to say that the brain is organised so as to construct a stable world, therefore to solidify, 'to record' in your words. That is what it is there for.	41:50 瓦雷拉：然而在你的问题中，它之所以会有如此多的方面，其中一个原因就是作为一名大脑研究者，作为科学家，他们的说法似乎也是有道理的，他们认为：大脑之所以被组织构建起来是为了建立一个稳定的世界，所以它要去“固化” ——用你的话说就是“去记录”。这就是它存在的意义。
42:17 K: I understand.	42:17 克：这我理解。
42:19 V: This is what it's history has been. Maybe you disagree, but at least, as far as I understand. Now, it is only when it comes to human beings that this question is posed. Then we can ask ourselves the question, is this no recording possible, as a swimming against the current of natural history, as it were.	42:19 瓦雷拉：大脑的历史就是这样的。你可能会不同意，但至少这是我所理解到的东西。而现在，只是在涉及到人类的时候，这个问题才会被提出来。然后我们就可以问问自己这个问题了，那就是：「不去记录」是否可能？这就仿佛是在历史自然的洪流中逆流而行一样。
42:45 H: Of evolution.	42:45 汉克：也就是「进化」。
42:46 V: Because natural history goes the other way, and in the moment this possibility arises, is it possible to unlearn evolutionary wise so as to come to the state of living in the world without recording, without self, and yet be a functional human being able to brush your teeth.	42:46 瓦雷拉：因为自然的历史进程是朝着相反方向发展的，所以当这种可能性出现的时刻，人类是否可能摒弃「进化论」的观点，从而在尘世中进入这种生活状态 ——即没有记录、没有自我，但仍然是一个可以正常运作的人，能够自己刷牙……
43:06 K: Of course, I said that.	43:06 克：当然了，这个我已经说过了。
43:07 V: Yes, I know. My feeling is that that is a question that can only be answered by exploring it from the actual experience of human beings, and the history seems to say yes, it is possible. We have examples and we know people who seem to have done that. Now from the point of view of what that implies for the brain, it's a fascinating point.	43:07 瓦雷拉：是的，我知道。我的感觉是这样的，那就是：这个问题只能够以这种方式来解答 ——那就是你要从人类实际经验的角度去探索它，而人类的历史似乎在说：是的，它是可能的。我们已经看到了一些例子，我们也知道有一些人似乎已经做到了它。而现在，让我们从这个角度来看：即这件事对于大脑来说意味着什么？这是很有趣的一点。
43:33 K: Sir, could we put the question differently? The brain has evolved through time. Centuries, a million years, or forty million years, or whatever it is, forty thousand, and it has probably reached its highest level, as much as it can, and that involves time, duration. What is time? Unless we understand what is time, I can go on indefinitely, right? People have asked too, is there an end to time – not science fiction, actually. Now, what is time? Apart from the clock, cut it out. Time is the past, the present, and the future. So time is contained in the now, all time. So the future is now.	43:33 克：先生，我们能否换个方式来问这个问题？大脑已经在时间的长河中进化了。无数个世纪，百万年的时间，或者四千万年的时候，或者无论多少年，比如四万年的时间，而它或许已经达到了它的最高水平，达到了它所能达到的极限，而这其中就涉及到了「时间」，涉及到了「一段时期」。那么，什么是「时间」呢？除非我们了解了什么是「时间」？否则我可以永无止境地一直讨论下去，是吧？人们也曾问过这个问题：时间是否能终结？ ——不是什么科幻小说里的东西，而是真正地结束掉「时间」。所以，什么是「时间」呢？不是那种钟表上的时间，先不要去管它。时间就是过去、现在和未来。所以，时间是包含在「现在」中的 ——所有的时间都是如此。所以「未来」就是「现在」。
44:58 V: Yes.	44:58 瓦雷拉：是的。
45:00 K: No, it is not a theory.	45:00 克：不，这并非理论。
45:02 V: No, I understand.	45:02 瓦雷拉：不是理论，我理解。
45:05 K: The future is now and the past is now, then what is action? If action is, 'I will do', the future, or 'I have done', it is not action. Action is now. The very word act means now. So, can the brain which has evolved, you follow my question? Go on, sir.	45:05 克：「未来」就是现在，「过去」也是现在，那么，什么是「行动」呢？如果「行动」是“我将会做……” ——也就是「未来」，或者“我曾经做过……” ——那它就不是「行动」了。「行动」就是「现在」。「行动」这个词本身就意味着「现在」。所以，那个已经发展进化的大脑，它是否能够你们跟上我的问题了吗？继续，先生。
45:54 V: The very description of saying the brain has evolved, is already the trap.	45:54 瓦雷拉：当你说大脑已经发展进化了 ——这种描述本身就已经是一个陷阱了。
45:59 K: We said that, it's a fact. I am not denying that, but if there is no radical revolution psychologically I will be tomorrow, modified, the same as today.	45:59 克：这个我们已经说过了，它是一个事实。我并没有否定这一点，然而如果我们在心理上没有根本性的革命，那么我的明天还是会和今天一样 ——只不过稍加修改罢了。
46:21 S: I would like to come back to where we were at the very beginning of this because I see a connection here, which is the level that you talked about, the so-called inward level.	46:21 西恩博格：我想要回到我们一开始讨论的东西，因为我在这里看到了一种关联，也就是你所谈论的那种层次 ——所谓的“内心的层次”。
46:34 K: Leave the word 'level', I said cut it out.	46:34 克：先别管“层次”这个词了，我说过了：别提它了。
46:38 S: Inwardly, there is an action. Now, at the beginning we talked about that inward action, immanent in that inward action is thought, and immanent in that movement of action is thought which separates. Now that's where the twist comes.	46:38 西恩博格：我们内心存在一种行动。你瞧，一开始的时候，我们谈论了那种「内心的行动」，而那种「内心的行动」内在所蕴含的东西就是「思想」，而那种行动的运动内在所蕴含的东西就是「思想」，这种思想造成了「区分」。而现在，在这里，转折点就来了。
47:04 K: We are saying thought is limited.	47:04 克：我们在说的是：思想是局限的。
47:07 S: What I am trying to get at is the fact that out of the inward level – I'll keep that word for the minute – out of the inward level comes thought. Now, the question is what is the relationship of that movement, that action, to thought?	47:07 西恩博格：我所试图理解的是这一事实：即从那种“内心的层次”中 ——我先暂时用一下这个词语—— 从这种内在的层次中就产生出了「思想」。而现在，问题就在于：这种运动这种行动，它和思想的关系是什么？
47:25 K: I don't quite follow you.	47:25 克：我不是很理解你的意思。
47:26 S: In other words, the state of observation without the observer, the action is immanent within a thought.	47:26 西恩博格：换句话说，那种没有观察者的观察的状态，那种行动是「思想」内在所固有的东西。
47:38 K: No sir. The observer is the observed. We agree to that, right? It is not a theory. No, just wait a minute. The observer is the observed. That is a tremendous fact, it is not a theory. It changes the whole way of living. There is no division as the observer and the observed, therefore no conflict. That's a theory, but to live that way, which means total eradication of conflict upon which the brain has evolved. You follow? So, when the observer is the observed and no conflict, there is a radical change in the brain. You follow?	47:38 克：不是这样的，先生。观察者就是被观察物。这点我们都同意了，对吧？它并不是一种理论。不，请稍等一下。观察者就是被观察物。这是一个很惊人的事实，它并不是「理论」。它会改变人类的整个生活方式。那时就没有观察者和被观察物之间的分裂了。由此便没有了冲突。这是一种理论。但你要以这种方式去生活，这意味着：你要完全根除掉冲突，在这个基础上，大脑才能发展进化。你理解了吗？所以，当观察者就是被观察物，从而没有了冲突以后，大脑中就会有一次根本性的改变了。你跟上了吗？
48:45 V: Yes.	48:45 瓦雷拉：跟上了。
48:46 K: A whole mutation takes place, if I can use that word.	48:46 克：一种完全的「突变」发生了 ——如果我可以使用这个词（突变）的话。
48:52 H: Yes, but your mutation implies time.	48:52 汉克：是的，但是你的这种「突变」暗示了「时间」。
48:56 K: No, mutation is change, biologically as well inwardly there is a radical revolution, because the brain has lived for forty thousand years on conflict.	48:56 克：不，突变就是改变，在生物学层面，以及内心层面，都有了一种根本性的革命，因为大脑历经四万年以来，一直活在冲突中。
49:18 V: Now, can I ask you what is the connection now between that possibility...	49:18 瓦雷拉：那么，我能否问一下你：现在，这两者之间的关联是什么 ——也就是那种「可能性」
49:27 K: I wouldn't use the word possibility.	49:27 克：我是不会使用「可能性」这个词的。
49:29 V: All right, what would you use?	49:29 瓦雷拉：好吧，那么你会使用哪个词？
49:34 K: When you use the word possibility, it means it may be possible.	49:34 克：当你使用「可能性」这个词，它意味着：这也许是可能的。
49:38 V: OK, that actuality, and the question you posed at the beginning: can I observe my brain without tearing it apart?	49:38 瓦雷拉：好吧，那就说“那个事实”吧，而你在一开始所提出的那个问题：我能否观察我的大脑而不把它分裂开来？
49:50 K: And without books, all these books.	49:50 克：也不要参考书籍，所有那些书籍。
49:53 V: How do these two things relate?	49:53 瓦雷拉：那么这两个事物是如何关联起来的？
49:58 K: Would you state that question again?	49:58 克：你能把这个问题再说一遍吗？
50:01 V: OK, you said at the beginning, I would like to say that I investigate my brain without tearing it apart, by seeing what is.	50:01 瓦雷拉：好的，你在一开始的时候说：我想要说：我会毫无分裂地去探究我的大脑，去看看它实际上是什么。
50:15 K: Yes, by seeing exactly what is.	50:15 克：是的，通过切实地看到大脑的真实模样。
50:19 V: And now you have also said there is the actuality of the ever-present nowness of the non-distinction where the observer is the observed.	50:19 瓦雷拉：而现在，你同样也说了：永远存在的「当下」也是事实，在它之中是没有区分的 ——观察者就是被观察物。
50:30 K: Do you realise what that means?	50:30 克：你意识到它意味着什么吗？
50:33 V: I do and I don't, it comes and goes.	50:33 瓦雷拉：我意识到了，也没有意识到，它来了，又走了。
50:37 K: To you it is a theory.	50:37 克：对你来说，它只是个理论。
50:39 V: Sometimes it is, sometimes it's not.	50:39 瓦雷拉：有时候它只是理论，有时候它就不是理论了。
50:41 K: I am not being personal. It is a theory.	50:41 克：我不是在针对你个人。它对我们来说只是一种理论。
50:44 V: Well, sometimes it's not.	50:44 瓦雷拉：哦，但有时候它并不是理论。
50:47 K: Either it is, or it's not.	50:47 克：它要么是理论，要么不是。
50:49 V: It comes and goes.	50:49 瓦雷拉：它是来来去去的。
50:50 K: No, it can't.	50:50 克：不，它不可能来来去去。
50:52 V: Why not? It is glimpses that do not persist.	50:52 瓦雷拉：为什么不可能呢？它可能是短暂的一瞥，并不会持续下去。
50:57 K: Make it simple. When you see something dangerous, it's finished. You don't go and say, I'll go and play with something dangerous, it's over.	50:57 克：简单来说当你看到了某个危险的事物，那它（危险）就结束了。你不会跑过去，然后说：我要过去，然后和那个危险的东西玩一下，这事儿已经结束了。
51:08 V: No, but you can see the car coming and get out of the way.	51:08 瓦雷拉：不，但你可以看到汽车冲过来，然后再躲开。
51:12 K: You do, but each time you see a car coming you can't keep out of the way all the time.	51:12 克：你确实可以，但是每次当你看到汽车冲过来，你不可能一直都能躲开它。
51:17 V: Are you telling me that it is not possible to learn by having a glimpse of something. When you have the glimpse you are there, and then something else happens that takes you off. There is a possibility of building on the continuity of the glimpses. Why does it have to be black and white, that it either is total or is not?	51:17 瓦雷拉：你是想要告诉我说：通过瞥见某个事物，你是不可能去学习的。当你瞥见到了你就在那儿，然后发生了一些其他事情，它将你带走了。但我们是可能建立起持续不断的“瞥见”的。所以为什么一定要这样“非黑即白”呢，要么就是完全彻底，要么就是没有？
51:39 K: Don't put it as black and white, that means total division.	51:39 克：不要说它是“非黑即白”的东西，这意味着彻底的分裂。
51:43 V: That's what I understood.	51:43 瓦雷拉：我的理解就是如此。
51:45 H: I think what you are saying is that in one's lifetime one sees certain things, one discovers something and then it becomes a memory from which one acts.	51:45 汉克：我认为你所说的是：在某人的一生中，他看到了某些东西，他发现了某些东西，但之后这些东西变成了「记忆」，而他则经由这种「记忆」来行动。
51:56 V: Which is not the thing itself.	51:56 瓦雷拉：由此它就不是那个东西本身了。
51:57 H: I think what you are saying is that the moment you have an insight into that, it is obviously not memory.	51:57 汉克：我认为你在说的是：一旦你对那个事物有了洞察，那它显然就不再是「记忆」了。
52:04 V: It is actuality, but then it becomes memory, and then it becomes actuality again, and there is this back and forth. No?	52:04 瓦雷拉：它成了事实，然后它又变成了记忆，之后，它又会再次变成事实，就这样来来回回。不是吗？
52:15 K: No.	52:15 克：不是。
52:16 V: How is it then?	52:16 瓦雷拉：那么是怎么回事呢？
52:18 K: Look, I am not a philosopher or anything, I will put it very simply. I have been going north for the last forty thousand years. You come along and say, look, that goes nowhere, go south, or east or west. The very movement of moving away from north to south, in that second, moving, in that movement the cells of the brain have changed because it has been accustomed to going there. Keep it simple.	52:18 克：瞧，我并不是一个哲学家或者任何此类东西，所以我会说得很简单。在过去的四万年里，我一直都是朝北走的。然后你过来了，对我说：瞧，这个方向是走不通的，你要往南走，或者往东走，或者往西走。一旦当你停止往北走而调头往南走时，在那一刻，你调头了，在这种运动中，大脑细胞就发生了改变，因为一直以来大脑已经习惯了往那里走。简单一点。
53:05 V: So you are raising, is that at all the case? Is that available to human beings?	53:05 瓦雷拉：你提出了这种观点，但情况确实是这样吗？这适用于全人类吗？
53:15 K: Oh yes, if they pay attention.	53:15 克：噢，是的，如果他们能付出「注意」的话。
53:18 V: Yes, but this is precisely my point...	53:18 瓦雷拉：很好，但我的观点恰恰是
53:21 K: They don't.	53:21 克：人们并没有这么做。
53:24 S: But why don't they?	53:24 西恩博格：可他们为什么不这么做呢？
53:26 K: That is simple enough, they have so many interests. First of all, they have to earn a livelihood – not that we don't have to. They have a dozen problems.	53:26 克：很简单，他们有着如此多的兴趣爱好。首先，他们必须要赚钱谋生 ——当然不是说我们就不用谋生了。他们有着一大堆的问题。
53:39 S: You came in and you've been introduced to Professor Varela, you were introduced to him, and to me, and tomorrow you come along and you say to me, hello, how are you today, implying that you've remembered. So, what is the relationship between that and this other?	53:39 西恩博格：你过来了，然后人们将你介绍给了瓦雷拉教授，你被介绍给了他，也介绍给了我，而明天你又过来了，然后你对我说：你好，你今天怎么样啊？这意味着你已经记住了我。那么，这件事和另一件事的关系是什么呢？
54:03 K: We've made that clear.	54:03 克：我们已经把它讲清楚了。
54:05 S: No, we haven't because we're bringing up here: are you in that state at that moment, it seems to me you are caught by something else.	54:05 西恩博格：不，我们还没有说清楚，因为我们讲到了这里：也就是在那个时刻，你是否处于那种状态中，在我看来，你当时已经陷入于其他事物中了。
54:14 K: I recognise that it is necessary. That constant being introduced is silly. I see that's necessary, but inwardly it is not necessary.	54:14 克：我认识到它（记忆）是必需的。因为不断地介绍再介绍，这是很愚蠢的。我看到它也是必要的，然而内心层面，它并不是必需的。
54:39 S: What's your relationship to me at that moment that you are recognising me and seeing it's not necessary?	54:39 西恩博格：在那个时刻，你和我的关系是什么呢？那时你认出了我，但同时也认识到这种记忆是没必要的？
54:47 K: It is not necessary.	54:47 克：它并不是必需的。
54:48 S: But at that moment what is the state?	54:48 西恩博格：所以在那个时刻，是一种怎样的状态呢？
54:52 K: I don't quite understand.	54:52 克：我不是很理解你的意思。
54:54 S: In other words, at the moment there is recognition what is the action, is there a state of action without the memory also going on?	54:54 西恩博格：换句话说，在有了「识别」的那一刻，那种「行动」是什么，是否存在着一种记忆不再运作的行动状态？
55:06 K: I don't quite follow this.	55:06 克：我不太听得懂。
55:08 H: Perhaps what he is saying is the very fact that you recognise somebody implies memory.	55:08 汉克：他在说的可能是你认出了某人——这个事实本身就暗示了「记忆」。
55:13 K: Of course, I said that.	55:13 克：当然了，这我已经说过了。
55:15 S: But what is the action then at that moment of the memory?	55:15 西恩博格：那么在那一刻，记忆的行动是什么呢？
55:19 K: What do you mean by action?	55:19 克：你所说的「行动」是什么意思？
55:25 S: Is one able to observe without memory while using memory? While seeing the relevance of memory but not being trapped by it.	55:25 西恩博格：我们是否能够在使用记忆的同时去没有记忆地观察呢？在看到与记忆相关联事物的同时，却不被它所束缚住。
55:37 K: I see it is relevant to have memory of a certain kind. Inwardly, why should I have the burden of memory? You say something to me, flattering, why should I carry that, it is silly.	55:37 克：我意识到拥有某种特定的记忆是至关重要的。但在内心领域，为什么我要有那些记忆的重负呢？你对我说了一些东西，比如一些奉承的话，但为什么我要记着这些话呢，这是很愚蠢的。
56:07 V: So, here is our man walking for forty thousand years to the north. Here is your man or our man, or me, walking for forty thousand years north, and then you come along and say, it's possible to walk south. And for the first time I turn around.	56:07 瓦雷拉：所以，在这里，我们说的这个人四万年以来一直朝着北方走无论是你说的这个人，还是我们说的这个人，或者说是我，四万年以来一直往北走，然后你过来了，对我说：你也可以往南走。于是我第一次转过身来了。
56:28 K: At that moment there is...	56:28 克：在那一刻，就有了
56:30 V: Yes, but now the observation, this is not theory, the observation of both the world, the natural world and in myself, is that I turn south and say no, I have to go north. Well, maybe I can go south. There is this kind of process until one finds a permanent reorientation.	56:30 瓦雷拉：是的，但是现在，这种「观察」 ——它不是理论上的观察，这种同时对两个世界的「观察」 ——自然物理世界和我的内心世界—— 就是我转向了南方，然后说：不，我必须要去北方不过，或许我也可以往南方走一下。会有这么一种过程，直到我们找到永久性的「再定位」为止。
56:53 K: Now, why? I'll show you in a minute. Why do we do this? I have been going north and you come and tell me, look, don't go that way, it is stupid, go east, and I'm not quite convinced. I'm not quite sure whether you are right because I have been used to going north. I have been used to that, and you say to me, go east. I say, I wonder if he is right, let me look at the east, no. There is this attraction to north which I've been going on for forty thousand years, and also I listen to you, there is some logic in what you say, reasonable, seems sane, and I turn but the attraction goes on, which means what? 57:58 I have not really listened to what you have said. Whether you are really serious, whether you mean what you say, whether you are experienced – not theory, it's yours in the sense you have found it. So, what you are, the quality of your voice, the quality of your being says go east, and I say, by Jove, I've listened to you very carefully and then I go east, I forget north. It depends whether you are speaking the truth or the theory. Not you personally.	56:53 克：那么，这是为什么呢？我马上就会来告诉你。为什么我们要这样做呢？我一直都是往北走的，然后你过来了，告诉我说：注意，不要走这条路了，这是很愚蠢的，往东走吧，但我并不是很相信你。我不是很确定你说得对不对，因为一直以来我已经习惯于往北走了。我已经习惯于它了，然而你却对我说：往东走吧。我对自己说：我不知道他是对是错，但让我看看东边有什么，可是北方牢牢吸引着我，因为四万年以来我一直都是往那里走的，但我也听了你的话，你的话也是有一些逻辑性、有一些道理的，它看起来是明智的，于是我转过身来了，但是「北方」的吸引力仍在，这意味着什么呢？ 57:58 这意味着我其实并没有认真听你之前所说的东西。所以我不知道你到底是不是认真的，你是不是说真的，你是否有亲身体验 ——由此它不是一种理论，而是你自己的东西，它的意思就是：你已经发现了它。所以，你自己是什么，你声音的品质，你「存在」的品质，它在说：往东走吧，于是我说：天哪，我非常认真仔细地听过了你的话，然后我便往东走了，我把北方抛在了脑后。这取决于你所说的是否是「真理」还是说只是「理论」。我并没有针对你个人。
58:46 V: No, I understand.	58:46 瓦雷拉：没有没有，我懂的。
58:50 K: Somebody says go north, I say, my dear chap, what do you know about it?	58:50 克：有人说：往北走，我说：我亲爱的老兄，你又知道些什么呢？
58:54 V: No, granted, but again I go back to the observation that that kind of complete communication...	58:54 瓦雷拉：没错，确实如此，但我会再次回过头去观察，而那种完全的交流……
59:02 K: That's all.	59:02 克：就是这样。
59:05 K: Complete communication then I forget north.	59:05 克：有了完全的交流以后，我便忘掉了「北方」。
59:08 V: Why doesn't it happen?	59:08 瓦雷拉：可为什么这样的事没有发生呢？
59:14 K: It is fairly simple. Going north, you have found security.	59:14 克：很简单。因为在往北走的过程中，你找到了安全感。
59:21 S: But that's not true.	59:21 西恩博格：但事实并非如此。
59:24 K: Don't reject it, look at it a bit more closely. To change a habit, a physical habit is fairly simple, but a psychological habit demands much greater energy.	59:24 克：不要拒绝这种说法，稍微仔细一点地去观察下它。要改掉一个习惯——某个身体上的习惯—— 这是相当简单的，但要改掉心理上的习惯则需要大得多的能量。
59:52 S: OK, then let's go at it more concretely, what is it that would break the habit of memory?	59:52 西恩博格：好吧，那就让我们更具体地来探讨下它吧，那个可以打破记忆习惯的东西是什么呢？
1:00:01 K: No, memory is necessary to write a letter, to read a book, to drive a car, linguistic communication, all that is necessary, but inwardly, why should there be all this memory carried about what you said to me, where you hurt me, all that stuff, throw it out.	1:00:01 克：不对，先生，「记忆」是必要的，没错吧？你需要用它来写一封信、读一本书、驾驶一辆汽车，进行语言上的交流，所有这些都是必需的，然而在内心层面，为什么还要携带着所有这些记忆呢？那些你对我说过的话，那些你对我的伤害，所有这些东西，把它们都扔掉吧。
1:00:35 S: That's too simple. That's simplistic, just throw it out – we don't.	1:00:35 西恩博格：这也太简单了。这很简单，只需要扔掉它就行 ——但我们并没有这么做。
1:00:39 K: It may sound simplistic but it's not.	1:00:39 克：它听起来也许很简单，但实际上并不简单。
1:00:45 S: We don't.	1:00:45 西恩博格：因为我们并没有这么做。
1:00:46 K: Why? That is the point he was raising.	1:00:46 克：那么为什么呢？这就是他所提出的核心问题。
1:00:50 S: I am raising it too.	1:00:50 西恩博格：我也提出了这个问题。
1:00:51 K: Because first of all, you come and tell me, I have been going north for the last forty thousand years, and you come and tell me, go east. I don't believe you. Who are you to tell me? What do you know about it? I begin to doubt, I begin to question, I'm cynical. So I have shut off all communication. But if you are really serious, in the sense that you have gone east, your whole being is different. I don't know. It is no longer a theory, it is a fact. I think we are cursed with theories, sorry.	1:00:51 克：那是因为，首先…… 你过来了，然后告诉我说：在过去的四万年里，我一直是往北走的，然后你过来告诉我说：往东走吧。我并不相信你。你又是谁呢，敢来教我？你又知道些什么呢？于是我开始怀疑，我开始发问，我变得愤世嫉俗起来。于是我就关闭了所有的交流沟通。但如果你真的是很认真的 ——这里「认真」的意思是：你已经往东走了，那么你的整个「存在」就变得不同了。我也不知道。那时它就不再是理论了，而是一个事实。我认为我们已经被理论束缚了，很抱歉这么说。
1:01:53 V: I go back and look at the history of many of the greatest and most alive spiritual traditions, and they all have been concerned with is to precisely coming up with skillful means to constantly reopen up that communication, because human beings seem to be incapable of actually sustaining that communication except in the most extraordinary cases.	1:01:53 瓦雷拉：于是我回过头来，我去追溯历史 ——那些有着无数最伟大、最有活力灵性传统的历史，然后我发现他们一直以来所关心的也正是去想出一些巧妙的方法来不断地“重启”那种交流沟通，因为人类似乎无法切实地维持这种沟通交流 ——除了在最奇特的情况下。
1:02:27 K: Why?	1:02:27 克：为什么呢？
1:02:30 V: The only way I can say of why, is to become again a biologist and say there is just too much past. And it takes a long time for a change to occur. There is no way we can change that faster.	1:02:30 瓦雷拉：能够让我说出原因的唯一方法就是再次变成一位生物学家，这样我就能说：因为我们有着太多的「过去」了。所以要那种「改变」发生，需要花费很长时间。而我们也没有什么办法可以加速这种改变。
1:02:49 K: I know that argument. So we have taken forty thousand years and now another forty thousand years.	1:02:49 克：我知道相关的争论。所以说，我们已经花费了四万年的时间，而现在，我们还要再花费四万年的时间？
1:02:57 V: Well, maybe less.	1:02:57 瓦雷拉：哦，也许用不了那么久了。
1:02:58 K: All right, twenty thousand years. You don't say that to a person who is suffering.	1:02:58 克：好吧，那就算两万年时间。你可不会对一个正在受苦的人说这样的话。
1:03:04 V: No.	1:03:04 瓦雷拉：不会。
1:03:06 K: Exactly. A person who is frightened, with a lack of security, say, wait old boy, you have lived that way, well, live for another twenty thousand years.	1:03:06 克：没错。你也不会对一个担惊受怕、缺乏安全感的人说这话，说：等下，老伙计，你的生活一直都是如此，所以，那就再这样子生活个两万年吧。
1:03:15 S: Wait a second, you just said that I am going north and I don't change because I'm finding security in the north, but I am not really finding security in the north.	1:03:15 西恩博格：等一下，你刚才说：我正在往北走，而我之所以不改变，是因为我在北方找到了安全感，但事实上我并没有在「北方」找到安全。
1:03:27 K: I think I am. That's it.	1:03:27 克：但我认为我找到了。就是这样。
1:03:30 S: Now, what is the understanding of the false security? In other words, how am I going to understand that it's false security?	1:03:30 西恩博格：那么，我们要如何才能对这种虚假的安全有所了解呢？换句话说：我要如何才能明白它是虚假的安全呢？
1:03:42 H: Where does understanding come to see what is false?	1:03:42 汉克：这种了解是从哪里来的 ——使得我们能看到虚假错误的东西。
1:03:47 S: I'm going north and you say go east and I say, this is fine by me. I don't believe that that's any better. Why should I listen to you that that's better?	1:03:47 西恩博格：我正在往北走，而你说：往东走吧。于是我说：我正走得好好的。我并不认为往东走会更好。为什么我要听你的，认为往东走更好呢？
1:03:56 K: You don't.	1:03:56 克：你不必听我的。
1:03:57 S: That's right.	1:03:57 西恩博格：好吧。
1:03:59 K: Why?	1:03:59 克：为什么？
1:04:00 S: Because both seem... I don't know why.	1:04:00 西恩博格：因为这两者似乎都…… 我也不知道为什么。
1:04:10 V: I'll tell you what I think. One listens at least for glimpses and then frightens back, is because north causes pain.	1:04:10 瓦雷拉：让我来和你说说我的想法吧。人们会聆听它——至少是为了瞥见一些东西—— 然后他们会因恐惧而折回，因为往北走给他们带来了痛苦。
1:04:23 K: Going north, why?	1:04:23 克：往北走（带来了痛苦），为什么呢？
1:04:25 B: Because the security is constantly based in a sense of struggle, which is painful. Therefore that is what allows the communication of the alternative to happen because you say, that seems better. It is as simple as that.	1:04:25 伯格斯特龙：因为那种安全感始终都是建立在那种挣扎斗争的感觉之上的 ——而这令人痛苦。因此，这便使得那种作为替代方案的交流沟通变得可行了，因为你会说：这看起来更好一些。就是这么简单。
1:04:42 K: But would you grant that human beings want security? The brain can't function at its highest energy if it is not secure. So where is there security? Either it's in illusion, or in a bank account, or in my relation to somebody. In my relation to somebody, I want it secure. No change. For God's sake, remain as you are! And no living being can remain what they are, so there is conflict, and, in spite of that conflict, I say, I must have security in her, or in him, or I seek security in God, in some faith, in some belief. Those are all illusions. So, I seek security in illusion, in relationship, in the bank account, or in the nation, in my tribe, My brain is wanting security.	1:04:42 克：但是你愿意承认这一点吗？那就是人类渴望安全。如果大脑没有安全感，那它就无法以最大的能量来运作。所以，哪里才有这种安全感呢？它要么存在于错觉幻想中，要么存在于银行账户中，或者存在于我和某人的关系中。在我和某人的关系中，我会想要这种关系安全牢固。不要发生改变。看在上帝的份上，请你保持原样吧！然而没有什么生灵能够一直保持原样，于是就有了冲突，然而我却不管这种冲突，我说：我必须要在她/他身上得到安全感，或者我会在「上帝」、在某种信念、某个信仰中寻找安全。但那些东西全都是幻想。所以我是在错觉幻想中寻找安全，我在人际关系中、在银行账户中，或者在「国家」、在我的部落中寻找安全，因为我的大脑想要安全。
1:06:23 H: The brain wants security in memory and thought but why is that?	1:06:23 汉克：大脑想要在记忆和思想中寻得安全，但为什么会这样呢？
1:06:28 K: Of course, because it must have security, and now the professors, the scientists come up with new theories, new problems, new issues, and the politicians – you know what they are doing – and come along so many gurus – I am lost. So I say, my God, where am I going to find security? So, another theory comes along, I say yes, I will hold on to that, it sounds reasonable. So the brain is always searching for security, somewhere.	1:06:28 克：当然会这样，因为它必须要有安全感才行，然而现在，各种教授、科学家，他们带着新的理论、难题和问题过来了，还有那些政客 ——你们都知道他们在做的事情—— 然后又过来了无数的古鲁 ——于是我不知所措了。于是我说：我的天哪，我要去哪里才能找到安全呢？然后，另一种理论出现了，我说：很好，我将会牢牢抓住它，它听起来很有道理。因此大脑永远都在某处寻找着安全。
1:07:24 S: I have the same perspective but slightly different in the sense that the brain is not only searching for security, but the brain is offering itself security in the process of the actual insecurity.	1:07:24 西恩博格：我也持有同样的观点，但稍有不同，它体现在：大脑不仅在寻找安全，它同样也在为自己提供安全感 ——在它处于真正不安全的过程中，它会这么做。
1:07:38 K: Yes, I agree.	1:07:38 克：是的，这点我同意。
1:07:41 V: That's the genius of the brain.	1:07:41 瓦雷拉：这就是大脑的天才之处。
1:07:44 S: That's essential, it means we're stepping on our own toes all the time.	1:07:44 西恩博格：这是至关重要的，这意味着我们一直都在“作茧自缚”。
1:07:49 K: That's what I am saying. You invent God and then worship God.	1:07:49 克：这就是我在说的东西。你们发明出了“上帝”，然后再去崇拜那个“上帝”。
1:07:53 S: Exactly.	1:07:53 西恩博格：正是如此。
1:07:54 V: Like somebody building up a Hollywood stage and then forgetting he built it, lives happily ever after.	1:07:54 瓦雷拉：这就像是某人搭建了一个好莱坞舞台，但他忘了是自己建造了它，并从此过上了幸福的生活。
1:08:01 V: I think we have the same question. This is precisely the point, we are so used to that which we can understand. It's crazy. That it's completely crazy.	1:08:01 瓦雷拉：我认为我们有着同样的问题。这正是关键点所在，我们总是对自己能理解的东西习以为常。这太疯狂了。这简直太疯狂了。
1:08:14 K: Absolutely.	1:08:14 克：完全正确。
1:08:15 V: But it is like a body which has been falling for twenty thousand metres and five metres before the ground he cannot say, stop! He can say, it's stupid that I'm falling, but there is this mass of inertia that continues. And the experience of man's past has been that that kind of complete communication of completely grasping the craziness of keep on going north, has to go through that flicker and the learning is stabilising that flicker until one internalises that, and that might take, I don't know, a lifetime or whatever.	1:08:15 瓦雷拉：这就像是一个身体一直在往下坠落，它下落了两万米，然后在距离地面还有五米的地方，这时他不可能说“停下来吧！ ” 他会说：我在坠落，这真的太愚蠢了，然而这股巨大的惯性还是会持续下去。而人类过往的经验告诉我们：这种完全的交流沟通要彻底领会“一直往北走” 的愚蠢疯狂之处，就必须经历灵光乍现的顿悟时刻，再通过学习将这种瞬间的顿悟沉淀为稳固的认知，直到我们把它内化吸收为止，但这需要花费……我不知道，也许要一生的时间或者无论多久。
1:08:57 K: That's the whole point. You say going north has taken time.	1:08:57 克：这就是全部的重点所在。你说往北走要花费时间。
1:09:04 V: A long time, yes.	1:09:04 瓦雷拉：是的，要花费很长时间。
1:09:07 K: And also you need time to go east. So we think time is necessary to change. Yes, of course.	1:09:07 克：此外，往东走你也需要时间。所以我们认为：要改变，我们需要时间。是的，当然是这样。
1:09:23 S: No, I don't think that. I think we need to come to an awareness. The thing I object to in what you are saying is that you are implying somehow that we can see it, and I'm saying that we're so caught by stepping on our own toes we'll never get out of it, we have to somehow come to terms with what we are. We're stepping on our own toes, that's our nature.	1:09:23 西恩博格：不，我并不觉得是这样。我认为我们需要达到一种「觉察」。对于你所说的东西，其中我所反对的一点是：你多多少少在暗示说我们可以看到这一点，而我在说的是：我们是如此的作茧自缚，以至于我们永远都无法从中解脱出来，我们最终还是不得不接纳真实的自己。我们一直在“作茧自缚”，这是我们的本性。
1:09:50 K: Yes, but wait a minute. Somebody like me, or X, comes along and says, just keep quiet for a minute, please keep quiet, just listen. But we can't keep quiet. We're chattering, telling me you are right, you are wrong. And I say, for God's sake keep five minutes quiet.	1:09:50 克：没错，但是请等一下。这时某个人——比方说我，或者张三李四—— 他过来了，然后对你说：请安静一分钟，请保持安静，只需要聆听就行。但我们却无法保持安静。我们会喋喋不休，你们会告诉我说：你是对的，你是错的。而我说：看在上帝的份上，请安静个五分钟吧。
1:10:15 S: Do you know the story of the scorpion and the turtle? The scorpion comes along and he says to the turtle, 'How about taking me across this lake?' The turtle says, 'Do you think I'm a nut? In the middle, there, you're going to sting me and we're going to drown.' 'Why would I do that? ' says the scorpion 'we would both drown.' The turtle says, 'You're right, get on my back.' So they get out into the middle and the scorpion stings the turtle. He says, 'What did you do that for?' he says, 'That's my nature.'	1:10:15 西恩博格：你知道那个《蝎子和海龟》的故事吗？有一只蝎子来到了海龟这里，对那只海龟说： “你能不能载我渡过这个湖？ ” 海龟说：“你当我傻子啊？当我载你到湖中间，在那里你就会蜇我了，然后我们将会淹死。 ” 蝎子说：“为什么我要那样做呢？这样我们两个都会淹死的。” 海龟说，“你说的也对，那就请坐到我的背上来吧。 ” 然后他们便来到了湖中央，而这时蝎子蜇了那只海龟。海龟喊道，“为什么你要这么做？ ” 蝎子说，“因为我本性如此。”
1:10:51 H: But where are we now? We started with the question whether we can understand the brain.	1:10:51 汉克：可我们现在讲到哪里了？我们是从这个问题开始的：即我们是否可以了解大脑？
1:10:56 K: Let's begin again.	1:10:56 克：那就让我们再次开始吧。
1:11:01 V: That sounds good.	1:11:01 瓦雷拉：这主意不错。
1:11:07 K: First of all I would like to ask do we see thought is limited? Whatever it does is limited. I don't know why you accept it so quickly.	1:11:07 克：首先，我想要问的是：我们是否看到了思想是局限的？因此它所做的任何事情都是局限的。我不知道为什么你这么快就同意它了。
1:11:26 V: Because it is something that I have been exploring myself.	1:11:26 瓦雷拉：因为我自己曾经探索过这件事情。
1:11:29 K: Which means our experience is limited, our knowledge is limited, now or in the future. Therefore our memory is limited and without memory there is no thought, so thought is limited, the sequence. So, whatever it does is limited. Technologically, psychically, or inwardly it is limited. And limitation must inevitably cause conflict, division. Therefore, is it possible for thought to operate where it is necessary and not operate in other directions?	1:11:29 克：这意味着：我们的经验是局限的，我们的知识也是局限的 ——不管是在现在还是未来。因此我们的记忆是局限的，而没有记忆，就没有思想，所以思想也是局限的，这是一个连续性的推论。所以，思想所做的任何事情都将是局限的。无论在科技领域、精神领域还是内心领域，思想都是局限的。对吧？而这种「局限」必然不可避免地会导致冲突、分裂。因此，思想是否可能只在需要它的地方运作，而在其他方向上则不运作呢？
1:12:39 B: Is there something which is not limited?	1:12:39 伯格斯特龙：是否存在某种「没有局限」的事物？
1:12:47 K: Maybe, we don't know but you can only find that out if thought has its proper place and no other place.	1:12:47 克：它也许存在，但我们并不知道，只有当思想处于它正确合理的位置，而不出现在其他地方时，你才能够发现它。
1:13:00 H: I think the confusion arises when you say thought might be used in one place and not in the other place. It seems to introduce a certain fragmentation.	1:13:00 汉克：我认为这种困惑之所以出现，是因为你说：在某个地方或许应该使用思想，而在另一个地方则不应该使用思想。但这似乎引入了某种「分裂」。
1:13:09 K: No, thought is necessary, I am speaking to you. I must know English and you know English. If you spoke French and I spoke French, then we would be speaking the same, or Spanish or Italian, we would do the same. So, knowledge is necessary to speak in English, right? Of course. Has knowledge any place in the psyche?	1:13:09 克：不，思想是必需的，我正在和你讲话。我必须懂英语，而你也要懂英语。或者如果你说的是法语，那我也要说法语，那时我们就可以用同一种语言来交谈，或者西班牙语或意大利语，我们也会这么做。所以我们需要知识才能用英语来交谈，对吧？这是毫无疑问的。那么「知识」在心灵精神领域有任何位置吗？
1:13:51 H: I would say it helps, to a certain limited extent to understand oneself.	1:13:51 汉克：我想说它（知识）在一定程度上是能够帮助我们了解自我的。
1:13:55 K: No.	1:13:55 克：它并不能。
1:13:57 B: May I say that in Finnish, the Finnish language has a word for 'know', which is 'tie', and in English it means 'road', that is 'knowledge'. But then 'understand' in Finnish means embrace. So, in the Finnish language, 'to know' would be to go along a road and not to see anything else, but 'to understand' in Finnish is to embrace, go around, and therefore I objected when you said knowledge and understanding would be the same. Because the brain has two ways: knowledge is to go a particular way, to search and search, but understanding is also a function of the brain, it is to embrace.	1:13:57 伯格斯特龙：我想说在芬兰语中，在芬兰的语言中有一个词能代表“知道”，它就是“tie” 而在英语中，它的意思是“道路”，它就是“知识”。然而在芬兰语中，“了解”这个词意味着“拥抱”。所以在芬兰语中， “知道”就是沿着某条路走，而不去看其他任何东西，然而“了解”在芬兰语中的意思则是“拥抱”，“四处走动”，因此我反对你的这种说法：你说“知识和了解是一样的”。因为大脑拥有两种方式：「知识」就是去走某条特定的道路，去不停地寻找，然而「了解」同样也是大脑的一个功能，它就是去“拥抱”。
1:15:17 H: I was saying that even knowledge has in itself a certain understanding that might be limited.	1:15:17 汉克：我想说即使是「知识」，它本身也拥有某种“了解” ——虽然这种了解或许是有限的。
1:15:27 K: Would you use a different word, insight?	1:15:27 克：你可以换个不同的词吗，比方说「洞察」？
1:15:34 V: Or intuition.	1:15:34 瓦雷拉：或者「直觉」
1:15:36 K: Intuition is a bit doubtful, because having desires you can...	1:15:36 克：「直觉」有点靠不住，因为你有各种欲望，所以你会
1:15:43 H: Could we say that the understanding coming out of memory and thought is to a certain extent mechanical?	1:15:43 汉克：我们可以说这种「了解」是来自于记忆和思想的吗？所以它在一定程度上是机械化的？
1:15:49 K: Let's use the word insight for the moment. I have an insight going north is futile, and the insight says go east, and I move. There is no interval between the movement...	1:15:49 克：让我们暂时还是先用「洞察」这个词吧。我洞察到了这一点：那就是向北走是徒劳无用的，这种洞察告诉我：往东走吧，于是我便往东走了。在这种运动和……之间是没有「间隔」的。
1:16:13 V: Again, we keep coming back exactly to the same point.	1:16:13 瓦雷拉：但这样的话，我们又再次回到了原点。
1:16:16 K: That's what I am saying.	1:16:16 克：这就是我在说的东西。
1:16:18 V: Yes, but you asked a question a moment ago: can we have thought to take its proper place, there. That is to say we are respectful for what it is. Now when you say I have the insight to go east and I do it, to be respectful to thought is also to realise that it is in the nature of thought to obscure that insight, to fill it with thought and continue to go north.	1:16:18 瓦雷拉：是的，但是刚才你问了一个问题：那就是我们能否让思想留在它正确合理的位置，留在那里。也就是说：我们尊重事物的本来面目。而现在，当你说：我洞察到了应该往东走，于是我就这么做了，而对思想的尊重，同样也是要意识到：思想的本性就是要遮蔽那种洞察，把思想念头灌输给它，然后继续不停地往北走。
1:16:55 K: It's not insight.	1:16:55 克：但这并不是「洞察」。
1:16:57 B: Well, it was for a moment and then it was occluded.	1:16:57 伯格斯特龙：哦，它会持续一会儿，然后它就会被遮蔽了。
1:16:59 K: I understand, you are repeating the same thing.	1:16:59 克：我理解，但你是在重复说着同样的东西。
1:17:02 V: Well, we are all going around the same subject. Let me put it this way, the question I have is: what is the basis from which you're saying that in that insight, all thought would be put into its right place without the flicker. What is the basis for that?	1:17:02 瓦雷拉：唔，我们都在围绕着同一个话题兜圈子。让我这样说吧，我所面对的问题是：你之所以能够说：在那种洞察中，所有的思想念头都会被放在它正确合理的位置上而无需什么灵光乍现的顿悟时刻 ——你这么说的基础根据是什么？
1:17:28 K: It's now five minutes past one, shall we stop?	1:17:28 克：现在已经一点零五分了，我们就先谈到这里吧？
1:17:32 V: We can pick it up next time, from there, please.	1:17:32 瓦雷拉：我们下次可以再来探讨它，就从这里开始，好吗？
1:17:36 K: Yes, anywhere you like.	1:17:36 克：可以，无论你想从哪里开始都行。
1:17:39 B: Insight, understanding, knowledge, these are the important questions.	1:17:39 伯格斯特龙：洞察、了解、知识，这些都是很重要的问题。
1:17:44 K: First of all we ought to discuss what is insight, the word, to have sight in something. An insight implies no memory, no time, quick perception, instant perception.	1:17:44 克：首先，我们应该去讨论一下什么是「洞察」。讨论下这个词语，去看到某些东西。「洞察」意味着没有记忆、没有时间，迅速地看到，立即就看到。
1:18:14 H: Yes, but the perception has to display itself through...	1:18:14 汉克：是的，但是这种「看」必须要通过……而显现出来。
1:18:17 K: Wait. Instant perception. Have we got that? Say for instance, I see something instantly and that perception never changes. I see the futility of all religions – organised. That's over, I don't belong to any religion. There is no going back to the temple, or to the church or to another guru, it's finished. I recognise those are all forms of entertainment really, and I don't want to be entertained, it is finished, wiped out. 1:19:20 There is not any kind of temptation to go and investigate, to look – I understand it. And this is a fact to me because I have done it. I am not boasting or anything, it is so. Take any factor which human beings cling to, this terrible nationalism, to be a Hindu, to be a Muslim. So, I have finished with it. I don't go back and say, let me play with nationalism a little bit. So can one move that way, all through life?	1:18:17 克：等一下。立刻看到它。我们有这种能力吗？比如说，我立即看清了某个东西，而这种「看清」是永远不会改变的。我看清了所有宗教的徒劳无用 ——那些组织化的宗教。这就完事儿了，然后我就不会再归属于任何宗教了。我不会再返回到寺庙里去了，不会再去教堂，也不会再去找另一个古鲁了，这件事已经结束了。我认识到它们其实是各种形式的娱乐，而我不想“被娱乐”，所以它结束了，它已经被抹除了。 1:19:20 我不再受到任何诱惑，会想要去那里，去研究它们，去看那些东西 ——因为我已经理解了这件事。这对我来说是一个事实，因为我已经做到它了。我并不是在自我吹嘘等等，它就是如此。你可以拿任何一个人类所执著于的要素来看，那种可怕的国家主义 ——成为一个印度教徒，成为一个穆斯林。所以，我已经告别了它。我不会再回去，然后说：让我再稍微玩一会儿国家主义吧。所以我们是否能够这样去行动 ——终其一生都这样去做呢？

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